Although a number of papers in the literature have shown the employment and wage differences between individuals receiving disability benefits and non-disabled individuals, not much is known about the potential employment and wage losses that disabled individuals suffer before being officially accepted into the disability insurance system (DI). Therefore, in this paper we compare individuals that enter into the DI system due to a progressive deterioration in the health status (ordinary illness) to similar non-disabled individuals. Our aim is to identify the differences in employment and wages between these two groups before disabled individuals are officially accepted into the DI system. We combine matching models and difference-in-difference and we find that the wage (employment) growth patterns of both groups of workers become significantly different three (five) years before entering the DI system. More specifically, our estimates suggest that 1 year before entering the system, there is a difference of 79 Euros/month in the wages of the two groups (8.3% of average wage) as well as a 7.8% point difference in employment probabilities.
Introduction
There is now strong empirical evidence showing that disabled individuals have lower employment rates and earnings than their non-disabled counterparts everywhere in Europe [29] . Apart from establishing the existence of a negative correlation between disability and labour market outcomes, a number of authors have also tried to estimate the causal effect of the onset of a disabling condition on employment and wages. The results of these studies are ambiguous as some of the papers find no evidence of a reduction in income due to a disability (Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez [21] for Germany or Walker and Thomson [36] for the UK) while some others find moderate to strong losses in annual earnings after the onset of a disabling condition (Charles [8] , Mok et al. [28] , Jolly [19] and Singleton [34] for the USA, Kidd et al. [20] , Contoyannis and Rice [10] and Jenkins and Rigg [18] for the UK, Halla and Zweimüller [15] for Austria). 1 For Spain, Garcia-Gomez and Lopez-Nicolás [13] estimate that a health event reduces the income of disabled workers in 1648 Euros/year. Additionally, heterogeneity seems to play an important role in this type of studies as variables that capture the socioeconomic status of the individual prove determinant in explaining the labour market outcomes after becoming disabled. In this line, Lundborg et al. [22] highlight that, in Sweden, the reduction in labour earnings is stronger for low educated and older individuals. This group of papers that focuses on the effects of a disabling condition on labour market outcomes typically measures disability with self-reported information on health status. In these settings, it is difficult to rule out the existence of endogeneity between the onset of a disabling condition and 1 3 labour market outcomes. Furthermore, the different findings in the literature can also be partly attributed to differences in the type of disability considered as well as to different institutional settings across the countries studied. A recent stand of the literature has focused on the labour market effects of disability using a more objective measure of disability status: the receipt of disability benefits. Those papers have clearly established a negative causal effect of benefit receipt on labour force participation [6] ; Von Wachter, Song and Machester, [35] ; Maestas, Mullen and Strand, [9, 11, 23, 25, 34] . For the Spanish case, Cervini-Plá et al. [7] find that individuals receiving disability benefits in Spain earn around 293-342 Euros/month less than similar individuals without a disability benefit.
Therefore, most of the previous literature analyzing the labour market disadvantages for disabled workers has focused on the employment and earnings losses as a result of self-reporting the onset of a disabling condition or as a result of the receipt of disability benefits. A less studied question is whether disabled workers are already suffering from a disadvantage in terms of labour market outcomes before the official recognition of the disabling condition. Thus, in this paper we use a large administrative dataset to estimate the wage and employment losses 10 years before individuals are accepted into the DI system. 2 More specifically, we compare the earnings and employment status (during the 10 years before DI) of individuals who will enter the DI system due to a progressive deterioration of their health status (ordinary illness) to those that are not disabled. The argument behind this comparison relies on the fact that an ordinary illness appears in a progressive manner so that the labour market impacts of this progressive deterioration in the health status of the worker may become apparent a number of years before being accepted into the DI system. This is entirely different from a disability that appears due to a sudden health shock, which we do not consider in the main sample as we exclude individuals that become disabled due to a working accident or professional illness (we use this alternative group of disabled individuals in the robustness check section). Therefore, individuals suffering from an ordinary illness are arguably spending a number of years with the disability until the severity of the condition is strong enough to be legally accepted into the DI system. We match individuals in the two groups on a rich set of observable characteristics 10 years before the receipt of the benefits and apply a difference-in-difference model to estimate the earnings and employment losses of individuals suffering from a progressive deterioration of their health status. We argue that, after matching individuals in the two groups, the only important difference between these workers is that one will enter the DI system after suffering from a progressive deterioration of his/her health condition. Therefore, we attribute the observed differences in the wage growth and employment paths of these two similar workers to the progressivity of the disabling condition of one of them. Indeed, in our data both groups of workers exhibit similar wage growth paths (employment rates) until three (five) years before entering DI. One year before entering the system, we estimate a difference of 79 Euros/month in the wages of the two groups (8.3% of the average wage) and a 7.8% point difference in employment probabilities. We also report important heterogeneity effects according to the age of the worker, his/her professional category as well as the type of disability benefit that he/she will receive (total or partial disability, which is a proxy for the severity of the condition).
The only three papers in the literature that focus on employment and earnings losses before becoming disabled are Charles [8] , Singleton [34] and Mok et al. [28] . In the later paper, the authors estimate a 66.8% (80.2% in [34] drop in annual earnings in the year of disability onset and a 49.3% (24.5% in [34] drop in the year before onset. Although the estimated effects in these papers are much larger than the ones we report here, there are at least two main reasons that can explain these differences in results. First, Charles [8] , Singleton [34] and Mok et al. [28] use a self-reported measure of disability while we use the receipt of DI benefits (which occurs after going through an objective medical examination) as our measure of disability. 3 Therefore, we believe that we capture a more exogenous measure of disability. Second and more importantly, although the papers by Charles [8] Singleton [34] and Mok et al. [28] include individual fixed effects in their models, they cannot control for endogeneity (if individuals report a disability as a result of experiencing a drop in earnings) and their results may be biased upwards (as the authors recognized in their papers). Our econometric approach, combining matching methods with diff-diff, as well as our large administrative database allows us to provide results that minimize the endogeneity problems.
In most developed economies with a well-functioning social security system, disability benefits are calculated as a function of previous earnings. Similarly, eligibility to the system typically also requires a minimum number of years of employment (contributions). Therefore, the results of our paper are important for policy makers as they suggest that taking the last years of labour market experience as a base to calculate the amount and eligibility of DI benefits may penalize those workers if they suffer from an ordinary illness that is making them incur in important earnings and employment losses long before being accepted in the DI system. This paper is organized as follows. "The Spanish DI system" section presents the characteristics of Spanish DI System. "Database and sample selection" section explains the dataset used and our sample selection. "Hypothesis and descriptive statistics" section shows our hypothesis and descriptive statistics. "Empirical model" section explains the empirical method used in the paper. "Results" section shows the main results and "Sensitivity analysis" section explores heterogeneity of the estimated effects along several personal characteristics. Finally, in "Robustness checks" section, we perform some robustness checks and conclude.
The Spanish DI system
The disability system in Spain distinguishes between two types of permanent disability benefits: (i) contributory, which is given to individuals who have generally contributed to the Social Security system before the onset of the disabling condition; (ii) and non-contributory, which is given to individuals who are assessed to be disabled but have never contributed to the Social Security system (or do not reach the minimum contributory requirement to access the contributory system). Non-contributory disability benefits are means-tested and managed at the regional level. 4 The size of the non-contributory system is relatively small compared to the contributory system (197,126 individuals received non-contributory disability benefits in 2009, while 920,860 received contributory benefits during the same year). The amount of benefits received is also smaller in the non-contributory case (the average non-contributory pension is 417.09 Euros/month compared to an average contributory disability pension of 831.49 Euros/month). As we want to assess the effect of disability on wages, we focus only on the permanent contributory disability system in Spain.
The Social Security defines permanent contributive disability insurance as the economic benefits to compensate the individual for losing a certain amount of wage or professional earnings when affected by a permanent reduction or complete loss of his/her working ability due to the effects of a pathologic or a traumatic process derived from an illness or an accident. 5 To capture the different situations in which a person can be after suffering from a disabling condition, the Spanish Social Security administration uses a classification of three main degrees of disability that depend on the working capacity lost 6 : partial disability if the individual is still capable of developing a different job or professional activity, total disability if the individual is impaired for the development of any kind of job and severe disability if the individual needs the assistance of a third person to develop the essential activities of daily living. 7 The eligibility requirements and the pension amount depend on the source of the disability (ordinary illness, work related or unrelated accident or occupational illness), the level of the disability and the age of the onset of the disabling condition. With respect to eligibility, the number of years of contributions required depends on the age of the onset of the disabling condition for common illness while there are no contributory requirements if the health impairment is due to either an accident or an occupational illness.
The number of years included in the regulatory base depends on the source of the disability; for common illness, the regulatory base is calculated by dividing by 112 the wage in the last 96 months (8 years) before becoming disabled. When the source of the disability is a work-unrelated accident, the regulatory base is calculated by dividing by 28 the wage in the last 24 months before becoming disabled. The individual can choose these 24 months from the last 7 years of work. For work-related accident or professional illness, the regulatory base is calculated by dividing by 12 the wage in the last 365 days before becoming disabled. 8 The total amount of the pension is obtained by multiplying a percentage, which varies depending on the type of 4 Income is evaluated yearly. The income threshold in 2010 was set at 4,755.80 Euros/year for an individual living alone. This amount is adjusted if the individual lives with other members. 5 Although the receipt of DI occurs after going through an objective medical examination, there is literature showing the existence of opportunistic behavior in insurance markets as a results of asymetric information (see Fortin & Lanoie [12] for a survey and MartinRoman & Moral [26] & [27] for two recent examples on Spain). 6 There is a fourth degree of disability benefits (permanent limited disability) but this type of benefits is already extinguished and it only consists on a one-time lump-sum payment. . 7 57% of claimants are in the partial disability system, 40% of claimants in the total disability system and 3% are severely disabled. 8 There was a reform in the calculation of the level of disability benefits for ordinary illness introduced in 2008. After the reform, there was a percentage that depended on the number of years contributed to the system that was multiplied by the regulatory base. As this change only affects individuals whose source of the disability is an ordinary illness, which could have an effect on the incentives to enter the DI system for this group of workers, in the robustness check section we will perform the same analysis but excluding the years after 2008 in order to have a sample period without any important reform of the DI system. pension and the degree of disability (as shown in the last rows of Table 10 ) to the regulatory base, which depends on the source of the disability and on previous salaries. 9 The percentage is 55 or 75% for partial disability beneficiaries, 100% for total disability and 150% for severe disability. Table 10 in the Appendix summarizes the main parameters of both the eligibility criteria and the pension formula.
The Social Security administration defines a working accident as the corporal damage of the worker suffered as a consequence of the job that he/she develops as an employee. This definition includes the following situations: injuries suffered in working hours, injuries suffered commuting to and from the workplace and injuries suffered in any other environment if the firm required the worker to develop the type of activity that caused the injury.
Database and sample selection
We use the Continuous Sample of Working Lives ("Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales", MCVL) which is a microeconomic dataset based on administrative records provided by the Spanish Social Security Administration. It contains a random sample of 4% of all the individuals who, at some point during 2010, had contributed to the social security system (either by working or being on an unemployment scheme) or had received a contributory benefit. 10 The random sample selected contains over one million people.
There is information available on the entire employment and pension history of the workers, including the exact duration of employment, unemployment and disability benefit spells, and for each spell, several variables that describe the characteristics of the job or the unemployment/disability benefits spell. There is also some information on personal characteristics such as age, gender, nationality and level of education.
To identify the employment and earnings losses that disabled workers experience before entering the disability system (t = 0), we distinguish between individuals that enter the DI system due to an ordinary illness (treatment group) and those who never enter the disability system in our sample (control group).
In the treatment group, we include everybody that enters the DI system either with a partial or total disability as a result of an ordinary illness between 1996 and 2010 (that is, they enter the disability system either in 2006 or 2007 or 2008 or 2009 or 2010) and we follow them from 10 years before entering the system until the year in which they are officially accepted into DI.
11 Therefore, we have five possible sequences of time as we shown in Table 1 .
We include only individuals that enter the system due to an ordinary illness as we are interested in diseases that appear in a progressive manner. Thus, in our baseline results we exclude individuals that enter the disability system due to a working accident or professional illness as these represent sudden health shocks (we are, however, going to use these individuals in the robustness check section). 12 The non-disabled sample (control group) follows the same sequence pattern of Table 1 . We have a 10% random 11 Before being accepted into the permanent DI system, the individual needs to spend some time in the temporary disability system while he/she receives the prescribed treatment. There is a maximum period of 18 months that each individual can spend in temporary DI. Therefore, we exclude the 18 months prior to the observed entry into permanent DI to make sure that we are capturing the labour market situation of the individual before going through any of the two DI systems. 12 In any case, even if some of our treatment groups experiences a sudden health shock instead of a progressive health deterioration, our estimates would represent a lower bound of the true effects as some of our treatment group would not be really treated. However, as presented in the robustness check section, when we use as an alternative control group individuals entering DI due to a working accident (sudden health shock) our results are almost identical than our baseline results. This suggests that common illness and working accidents are two different types of disabilities with a different degree of progressivity in health deterioration. 9 Benefit = regulatory base * percentage. 10 This means that the only individuals that are missing from this database are those who were inactive in 2010 and did not receive any kind of contributory benefit (such as disability, orphan, widow, etc.). Furthermore, the sample is representative for 2010 but, as exit from the disability system is extremely low (0.01%), we are confident that the sample is also representative for the other years included in the analysis.
sample of individuals who did not become disabled in those 5 years (2006 to 2010) and we follow them back 10 years.
We restrict the sample to include only individuals between the ages of 35 and 65 at the time of entering the DI system or year 0 for the non-disabled. We have chosen age 35 because we need to observe the labor market history of these workers 10 years before t = 0. We have chosen age 65 because individuals in the disability system are automatically transferred to the old-age system when they turn 65 years old.
The selected sample contains 153,820 individuals (1,476,778 person-year observations in total), 30,865 of them become disabled due to an ordinary illness while 122,955 are non-disabled.
With respect to the labor market trajectory and wages of these workers during the 10 years preceding t = 0, we consider an individual to be employed if he/she is observed as working on June 15th of that year. Therefore, if he/she is reported as working we calculate his/her wage as the monthly average wage in June. In order to take into account that some individuals may not work the entire month, we divide the wage received in June by the total number of days worked in that month. Following this, we multiply the figure by 30 so as to have an adjusted measure of the monthly wage.
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Hypothesis and descriptive statistics
As explained above, our interest lies on the estimation of the employment and earnings losses for individuals suffering from a progressive disability before they are officially acknowledge as such. In order to do that, we will distinguish between individuals that access the DI system due to an ordinary illness from non-disabled individuals. We will examine the differences in the employment and wage growth pattern of these two groups of workers 10 years before entering the DI system. The idea behind this comparison is that individuals suffering from an ordinary illness experience a progressive deterioration of their health status. Thus, individuals with an ordinary illness need to spend some time before reaching the necessary health threshold to get access to the DI system. 14 As wages grow over time, by comparing the wage growth path of individuals who suffer from an ordinary illness to those that are not disabled we will be able to identify how much wages failed to increase in the group of workers with an ordinary illness. The reason behind the potential difference in wages is the progressivity of the disabling condition that deteriorates their productivity levels and, therefore, their employment prospects and their wages. We could alternatively use as control group individuals that enter the disability system due to a working accident and we do that in the robustness check section. However, the number of individuals in our sample that suffer from a working accident is only 2337. Thus, our treatment group (those that enter the DI system due to an ordinary illness) that has 30,875 individuals would have to be matched with a control group of only 2337 individuals. For this reason, in our baseline specification we use as control group the general non-disabled population and we present the results with the working accident sample as a control group in the robustness check section.
Looking at Figs. 1 and 2, we can already get a first impression of the hypothesis developed above. As can be observed in Fig. 1 , the monthly real wages of individuals that will enter the DI system due to an ordinary illness (at time 0) and those of non-disabled individuals have extremely similar levels and evolution from 10 years before entering DI up until 4-3 years before getting into the system. 4 years before entering DI, individuals that will enter the DI system at time 0 experience a strong drop in wages with respect to their non-disabled counterparts.
Similarly, Fig. 2 plots the evolution of employment probabilities from 10 years before entering DI. In general Monthly real wages before entering the DI system 13 In an alternative specification, we have tried the results by summing the number of days worked during a year and adding up wages received during all the months employed in that year. Then, we divide this number by the total number of months worked so as to obtain a monthly measure. The results of this alternative specification go in the same direction and are available upon request.
14 Our dataset does not provide information on the type of diseases that is causing the disabling condition. However, we use data from the Survey of Individuals with Disabilities in 2011 to observe that 25% of the sample of individuals that receive disability benefits in 2011 is due to osteo-articular problems, 12% are due to neuromuscular problems, 18% due to mental illness and 10% to cardiovascular, immunologic and respirator diseases. These types of diseases are likely to entail a progressive deterioration of the health status until reaching the severity level required to access the permanent disability system.
Footnote 14 (continued)
terms, employment probabilities are slightly higher for nondisabled individuals although the evolution is similar for the two groups of workers up until 5 years before entrance into the system. However, when we get closer to the date of entry into the system, employment probabilities of individuals who will enter DI start decreasing. On the other hand, employment probabilities for non-disabled workers are remarkably stable during the entire period. As it can be seen in the two figures, employment probabilities start decreasing before wages and, after 1-2 years of lower employment probabilities, we can see that the effect is already showing up in the wages trajectory. Of course, this graphical evidence does not allow us to automatically attribute these differences in the wage growth path and employment probabilities to the progressivity of the disabling condition. Alternatively, these differences in the evolution of wages and employment probabilities could be attributable to different types of individuals between the two groups (in any other dimension). For example, the observed differences could be caused by differences in education levels, age of the workers or sectors of the economy where they are employed that could jointly determine both the probability of suffering from an ordinary illness as well as the employment and wage patterns.
As far as these differences between individuals in the two groups are observable, we can include them as controls so that we are able to isolate the variation that is due to the fact of suffering from a disabling condition before being able to enter the DI system.
In that sense, to get a first impression of the similarity of workers in these two groups, Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the two dependent variables (wages and employment probability) and our explanatory variables for the two groups of individuals. 15 As we can see in Table 2 , the composition of individuals in the two groups differs in several of the dimensions analyzed. As we can observe in the last two columns, we find statistically significant differences in the proportions of the majority of the variables. Therefore, we will apply a matching technique to make sure that we are comparing pairs of individuals that are as similar as possible ( Table 3 in the next section presents the descriptive statistics of matched individuals and there is no difference in the means of the characteristics in the treatment and control groups).
Empirical model
We apply three methods in order to distinguish the difference in the wage path and two methods to explore the differences in employment probability between individuals that will enter the DI system due to an ordinary illness and nondisabled individuals.
First of all, only for wages we follow a similar approach than Charles [8] to identify the wage path before the individual enters the DI system and we estimate the following regression:
where W it represents the log of averaged monthly earnings of person i in year t, X it are the control variables: education, professional category, age at t = − 10, sector of activity, gender, nationality, type of contract (temporary or not), type of the work day (part-time or full-time contract) and sequence. 16 The variables of interest are the two binary variables: D it and ND it . In particular, D it takes value 1 if the individual enters the DI system in the year 0 and ND it takes value 1 if the individual does not enter the DI system during our sample period. Both variables are multiplied by d it that measures the distance before t = 0 and ranges from − 10…to 0.
With this regression, we can compare the path of earnings for these two groups of workers.
Although we include a set of control variables in the regression, we could still argue that disabled individuals are concentrated in some types of activities or some types of workers (evidence of these differences has been shown in the descriptive statistics in Table 2 ). Therefore, we employ a second method which tries to take this differences into account; Propensity Score Matching (PSM). With this method, we want to estimate how much employment probabilities and wages change, on average, for those individuals who will enter the DI system, compared to the hypothetical state of not being 15 The descriptive statistics are taken in the last period before the individual becomes disabled. However, most of the variables relate to personal characteristics that are time-invariant (such as education, gender, nationality, etc.).
disabled. One of the main problems in measuring this change is that the individual actually experiences only one of the situations. Therefore, we make use of matching methods to allow for the counterfactual approach, associated with treatment effect techniques for policy evaluation. Formally, let D = 1, 0 indicate if the individual is actually treated or not. In our case, if the individual enters the disability system or not. Let X be the set of observed characteristics and W 1i and W 0i be the potential variable of interest if the individual is treated or non-treated, respectively. The notion of "potential" is used to emphasize that only one of W 1i or W 0i is observed for every individual in the sample.
In this context, we want to measure the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) that is given by the following expression:
Clearly, is not identified by the data, since we observe each individual in one of the possible states in each moment in time. Therefore, we do not observe the counterfactual. If we assume that the probability of entering DI is random, we could solve this problem using the control group, those who do not enter DI, as a counterfactual. However, as outlined above, it is likely that disability occurs in certain professions or economic sectors more than in others.
Therefore, our empirical strategy relies on the fact that we have sufficient information on the characteristics of the individual and the type of job that he/she has before entering the system. In this context, we use the PSM to create subgroups where the treated and control individuals do not differ 10 years before entering the system and then we use different matching techniques to compare the individual in the treated group that is most similar to an individual in the control group. 17 In particular, our conditional independence assumption is:
This strong assumption is known as selection on observables and was introduced by Rubin [30, 31] and Rosenbaum and Rubin [32, 33] .
The idea is that using this method, the ATET is identified under the assumption that observable controls and the pretreatment outcomes include all factors that determine both W 1i , W 0i ⊥D|X the probability that an individual enters the DI system, as well as his potential employment probability and wage in the absence of the disability.
Therefore, in an attempt to relax this strong hypothesis, the third method that we use to estimate the effect of interest is a combination of Difference-in-Differences (DID) with PSM. More specifically, we estimate a DID model using weights obtained from the PSM (see García-Gómez et al. [14] for a detailed explanation of the approach). The main idea of this new technique is to use PSM to obtain a comparable set of treated and control individuals and estimate a DID model to control for fixed unobservable characteristics. Essentially, by running this weighted DID regression we weaken the identifying assumption of the matching estimator (conditional independence assumption). Therefore, this technique only requires that, conditional on observables, in the absence of the shock the evolution (not levels) of employment probabilities and wages before and after the shock would have been the same for the treated and their matched controls [17] ; Blundell and Costa-Dias [4] ). 18 Following the rational of this technique, our treated group is formed by individuals who are not in the disability system in t = − 10, t = − 9, t = − 8,…, t = − 1, and become officially disabled (that is, enter the DI system) in t = 0. See Table 1 for more details.
As a control or comparison group, we want similar individuals in t = − 10, the moment in which we construct the propensity score. Those individuals continue being nonofficially disabled in t = − 9, t = − 8,…, t = − 1, and also in t = 0.
We match individuals in the treated and control groups with the propensity score in t = − 10, where both individuals were not in the DI system. We use: age at t = − 10, education, professional category, sector of activity, gender, type of contract (temporary or not), type of the work day (parttime or full-time contract), sequence, nationality, region and wages in t = − 10 as explanatory variables.
As we can see in Table 3 , treatment and control individuals are similar in all dimensions of the observed characteristics and the mean of the variables in the two groups is not significantly different for any of the characteristics analyzed. Thus, our PSM allows us to correct all the differences observed in Table 2 between the treatment and control groups.
Results
Effect on wages
In this section, we try to quantify the effects of being officially disabled on wages. In order to do that we compare the wage pattern of individuals that enter the DI system due to a common illness with those that are non-disabled. We use a large enough time span, 10 years prior to being accepted into the DI system, so that individuals are similar enough because, for most of them, the disability has not been initiated yet. Table 4 shows the results of the estimation of equation [1] for wages, i.e., the wage path for disabled and non-disabled during the 10 years before entering the DI system. Here we only present the coefficient of the interaction between the two main dummies (in the disability system or not at t = 0) and the distance to the event (getting access into the DI system). The results of the full regression are presented in Table 11 in the Appendix. The reference year is − 10 (10 years before the individual enters the DI system or 10 years before t = 0 for non-disabled individuals). 19 As we can see in Table 4 , real wages for both types of workers increase every year compared to the reference year. However, from 4 years before onset, wages of non-disabled grow faster than wages of individuals that will enter the disability system due to an ordinary illness. From 4 years before entering the DI system, individuals that will enter the DI system due to an ordinary illness show a disadvantage in terms of wages in the labor market and their position deteriorates relative to individuals that will not become disabled.
For example, in t = − 1, i.e., 1 year before disabled enter the system (compared to the situation at t = − 10) wages of workers who will not enter the disability system, controlling for characteristics, are on average 782 euros per month higher than wages of individuals who will enter the DI system. 20 On average wages at t = − 10 were about 883,2 euros per month for those individuals who will not enter the DI system and 904,3 euros per month for those that enter the DI system due to ordinary illness. Then, if wages of workers that do not enter the system increased by 15.2% in t = − 1 this gives an average wage of 1041.8 euros per month. On the other hand, the increase in wages for those that enter the DI system is 9.1% which gives an average wage of 963.6 euros in t = − 1. Therefore, that gives us a difference of 78.2 euros. 18 Of course, there could be some other events that change over time differently for our treatment and control group (i.e. individuals in the treatment group could start smoking at a higher rate than individuals in the control group during the 10 years included in our sample). Although we think these systematic differences in the treatment and control group that appear over time (in a 9 year period) are unlikely, we include them in our definition of "progressive health deterioration" and acknowledge that the impacts on employment and wages can be due directly to the disabling condition or to any health deterioration that is determining the existence of a disability at the same time. 19 We choose to show the results from 10 years before entering the DI system because, as it can be seen in Figs. 2 and 3, the differences in both employment and wages between the two groups of individuals only start appearing from 5 or 4 years before getting access into DI.
In order to make sure that we are comparing individuals as similar as possible, in a second specification we estimate ATET effects following Becker and Ichino [3] , Abadie and Imbens [2] and Abadie et al. [1] . In order to apply this method, we first estimate the propensity score (the probability of being in the treatment group) by a probit specification (as we have two possible states; individuals that will enter the disability system due to a common illness versus individuals that do not enter the DI system). As we have explained before, we match individuals in the treated and control groups with the propensity score in t = − 10, where both individuals were not in the disability system. As explanatory variables we use all the variables available in the administrative dataset: age when entering the DI system, education, professional category, sector of activity, gender, type of contract (temporary or not), type of the work day (part-time or full-time contract), sequence, nationality, region and wages at t = − 10. The specification passes the "balancing hypothesis". This means that there are no systematic differences in observable characteristics between the treated and control groups once we condition on the propensity score. After that, we match treated and control individuals using the nearest neighbor matching approach. 21 Furthermore, we restrict our sample to observations within the common support range. Table 5 presents the estimates of ATET on wages at t = − 9, t = − 8,…,t = − 1. The dependent variable we use is the monthly average wage. 22 In particular, we use wage as the monthly average wage in June. In order to take into account that some individuals may not work the entire month, we divide the wage received in June by the total number of days worked in that month. Following this, we multiply the figure by 30 so as to have an adjusted measure of the monthly wage. 23 As shown in Table 5 , four to 10 years before t = 0 differences in earnings between the two groups are very small and insignificant once we control for observable characteristics. However, once we get closer to the moment in which the treated group enters the DI system we begin to observe an increased wage gap. More specifically, in t = − 1, using the Propensity Score matching method, the gap amounts to almost 71.96 Euros/month on average. This result is very similar to the 78.2 Euros wage gap that we obtained in the previous section using separate regressions for both groups. In any case, even if the results of the two estimation methods are quantitatively very similar, we prefer the results of the matching model as it allows us to compare two individuals that are more similar in observed characteristics.
Finally, in the last column of Table 5 , we follow García-Gómez et al. [14] and we compare the impact of disability on wages using a combination of PSM with DID. The results obtained are slightly greater but in the same direction to those obtained when we only use PSM. As shown in this last column, differences in wages of the two groups are only significant from 4 years before entering DI. For t = − 1, the earnings gap is almost 79 Euros/month on average. This earnings gap represents 8.3% of the average wage of individuals who will enter the DI system. 24 Nonetheless, by looking only at wages, we are missing another potentially very important effect of disability on labor market outcomes. Individuals that will enter the DI system could also be penalized by losing their jobs instead of by earning lower wages way before they are officially accepted into the DI system. Therefore, in the following section we analyze the effects of disability on employment. As there is no element (a priori) to choose one matching technique over the others we show the results of the same model but using kernel matching and stratification matching in Table 12 in the Appendix. 22 We do not use wages but a proxy for wages, the contributory base, over which the contributions to the Social Security administration are calculated and paid. As it often occurs with Social Security records, the difference between contributions and wages is that contributions are top-and bottom-coded, that is, they are censored. Although for the entire MCVL this is a significant problem, as Bonhomme and Hospido [5] mention such an issue is likely not to be empirically relevant in our case as our sample does not include neither top nor bottom wages earners (bottom earners are typically concentrated in the non-contributory DI system). 23 Alternatively, we calculate wages adding the wages received in all the months worked and dividing it by the total number of months worked so to obtain a monthly measure. The results of this alternative exercise go in the same direction and are available upon request. 24 The average wage for individuals in our sample that will enter the DI system due to an ordinary illness is 943.5 Euros/month in t = − 1. Table 6 reports the results of the same ATET model than the one for wages but with employment as the dependent variable. Our dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the individual is observed as working on June 15th of that year. As it can be observed in the first column of Table 6 , when we estimate the effects with a PSM, workers that will enter the DI system experience significantly lower probabilities of employment than non-disabled individuals since 5 years before entering the DI system. The coefficient can be interpreted as the percentage point difference in the probability of working between individuals in the treatment (entering the DI system) and control group (non-disabled).
Effects on employment probability
In t = − 1, workers who will enter the DI system at t = 0 have a probability of working of around 5.7% points smaller than workers who will not enter into the DI system. In the last column of Table 6 , we report results of the estimation combining PSM and DID. Again coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage point difference in the probability of working between individuals who enter the DI system and those who do not enter in the system as they are not disabled. Our results show that individuals that will enter the DI system present significantly smaller employment probabilities as soon as 5 years before entering DI. More specifically, 1 year before entering the system, disabled individuals have a probability of working 7.8% points smaller than those who are not disabled. 25 
Sensitivity analysis
The incidence of disability on wages and employment may differ along several individual dimensions such as age, professional category or the degree of disability (total or partial). In order to explore the existence of heterogeneous effects along these dimensions in this section, we estimate our preferred specification, PSM with DID and the Nearest Neighbor Matching approach, for several categories of workers.
To analyze the differences that arise from age, we estimate our model for three different age groups at the time of entering DI: those under 45, those between 45 and 55 and those older than 55 years old. Table 7 shows the results obtained for the different age groups. We can see that the average wage gap is much greater for younger workers (118.91 Euros/month).
We do not find an important wage gap for workers above age 55 although the employment gap for this group of individuals is significant and appears already 4 years before entering DI. Thus, the older group of workers seems to be more penalized for their disability in employment probabilities rather than in wages whereas the younger group of workers is penalized both with lower wages and employment probabilities.
In Table 8 , we analyze the heterogeneity that comes from different professional categories and, as it can be observed, the wage gap is greater for skilled workers. However, employment losses for individuals suffering from a progressive disability begin earlier and are more important for the group of unskilled and semi-skilled workers (5 years before entrance into DI). Although 1 year before entering the system the employment losses are important for all type of disabled workers, the differences in the probability of working for skilled workers only become significant 3 years before DI and are smaller compared to the unskilled workers.
Finally, Table 9 presents differences in employment and wage losses between individuals that will enter the DI system and those that are not disabled according to the type of disability benefits once they enter the DI system (total or partial). The degree of disability benefits, which can be partial or total, is set according to the severity of the disabling condition. We can see that the wage gap is greater for workers that will enter the DI system with a totally disability benefit than for workers that receive a partial disability benefit. The same happens for employment losses, we do find a significant difference in employment probabilities for both types of individuals from 5 years before entering DI although the employment loss is stronger for workers that will become totally disabled. These results reinforce the idea that a progressive deterioration of the health status is accompanied by a wage and employment loss for some years 
Robustness checks
To analyze our results in more detail, in this section, we perform some robustness check. First, Tables 12 and 13 in the Appendix reproduce the baseline results using kernel and stratification matching instead of nearest neighbor matching for wages (12) and employment probabilities (13) . The results are quantitatively and significantly similar to our baseline results. Second, Table 14 in the Appendix reports the results of our baseline preferred model (PSM with diff-diff) using an alternative identification strategy. Instead of comparing those that enter the DI system due to a common illness with non-disabled individuals, we compare individuals that enter the DI system due to a common illness with individuals that enter the system due to a working accident. The idea behind this comparison is that individuals suffering from a working accident experience a sudden health shock which gives them access to the DI system while individuals suffering from an ordinary illness experience a progressive deterioration of their health status. Therefore, individuals that experience a working accident have a previous wage path similar to nondisabled individuals. The estimated wage gap is around 66 Euros, a very similar amount to the one obtained when using as a comparison group non-disabled individuals (70 euros). However, we prefer our baseline model in which we use the non-disabled population as the control group because we only have 2337 individuals that suffer a working accident in our sample. Thus, we are matching a large number of treated individuals with a very small number of control individuals. With respect to employment probabilities, we can see that this alternative specification shows an estimated drop in the probability of working by 9.9 percentage points 1 year before entering DI. Again, this is a very similar result than in our baseline specification when the control group is formed by non-disabled individuals (7.8 percentage points). Thus, the two estimations using different comparison groups show relatively similar results and allow us to present a bracket of an estimated earnings gap between 70 and 88 Euros/month and an employment gap of 7.8-9.9 percentage points on average.
In addition in Table 15 of the Appendix, we perform a placebo test by comparing individuals that enter the DI system due to a working accident to the non-disabled. That is, we compare our two control groups. As expected, we can see in Table 15 that we do not find any effect on wages or employment probabilities in the years prior to the entrance into the DI system between these two groups.
Finally, in Tables 16 and 17 , in an attempt to understand whether the economic crisis has had an impact on the results that we find, we perform an additional exercise in which we estimate the effects separately for sequences 1 and 2 (which correspond to the individual becoming disabled before the crisis) as well as for sequences 3, 4 and 5 (which correspond to the individual becoming disabled after the crisis). The results shown in Tables 16 and 17 for wages and employment, respectively, show that the effects of interest are almost the same for individuals entering the system before or during the crisis.
Conclusions
In the literature, it has been widely assessed that individuals suffer from both reduced wages as well as lower employment probabilities once they become disabled and enter the disability system. However, a less studied question is whether these loses are already present for disabled workers before they are actually accepted into the DI system. Therefore, in this paper we try to shed some light to this question by estimating the extent to which workers are already suffering from reduced wages before being officially recognized as disabled and, thus, before receiving the corresponding benefits. As it has been well documented, the relationship between disability and labor market outcomes is difficult to estimate due to the existence of endogeneity problems; assessing the moment in which the individual first suffers from a disability is not a trivial issue. To overcome this problem, we make use of a large microeconomic dataset from the Spanish Social Security administration and apply matching models combined with difference-in-difference to compare the monthly earnings and employment growth of individuals who will enter the DI system due to an ordinary illness and non-disabled workers. We argue that the comparison of the labour market outcomes of these two groups of workers 10 years before they are accepted in the DI system gives us an unbiased estimate of the effects of disability on wages and employment before those workers are accepted into the DI system. The idea behind this argument is that ordinary illnesses tend to appear in a progressive manner so that individuals suffering from an ordinary illness are presumably spending a number of years with the disabling condition before being legally accepted in the DI system. We use this distinction to apply a matching combined with a difference-in-difference technique to compare the wage growth and employment pattern of two individuals with similar observable characteristics 10 years before entering the DI system. We argue that, after matching individuals on a number of observable characteristics 10 years before entering the system and controlling for fixed unobservable characteristics with the DID, the only important difference between these two workers is that one will suffer from a progressive deterioration of his/her health condition until the moment of being accepted into the DI system (while the other will remain non-disabled). Therefore, we attribute the observed differences in the wage growth and employment path of these two similar workers to the progressivity of the disabling condition. Our results show that the wage growth patterns of both groups of workers become significantly different 3 years before entering the DI system. One year before entering the system, we estimate a difference of 79 Euros/month in the wages of the two groups. This amount represents 8.3% of the average wage of disabled individuals in Spain. Differences in employment probabilities are quantitatively also important; our estimates suggest that employment differences between the two groups of workers become significantly different as soon as 5 years before entering the DI system. One year before entering DI, individuals that will enter the DI system have a 7.8% point lower probability of working. We also report important heterogeneity effects for younger and unskilled workers as well as for individuals with a stronger health condition.
The results of our paper are important for policy makers as they suggest that taking the last years of labour market experiences as a base to calculate the amount and eligibility conditions for DI benefits may penalize those workers if they suffer from an ordinary illness that is making them incur in important earnings and employment losses long before being accepted in the DI system. 
